Greg Detre
@14 on Tuesday, 01 May, 2001
Dr J Hymans, Queens
missed week I
parts/wholes in substances vs attributes
dribbling is a part of being able to play football, but you can't think of being able to play football without being able to dribble in the same way that you can think of a body without a leg
is going to ignore eliminativism
developed as a methodological precept of empirical psychology
phil of mind is most interested in analytical behaviourism � never quite flourished � most attractive during the heyday of verificationism
the evidence for other minds consists of their behaviour � cannot be inductive, since inductive is based on separately-evidenced correlations
Concept of Mind (1949), written year before, same year as 1984
Cartesian dualism = category mistake
avoids the principle defects of Cartesian dualism
what makes this mind experiencing itching the same as the mind which is having these thoughts, and those thoughts a week ago
�I used to argue that itches are just thwarted impulses to scratch�
first popular alternative to behaviourism
originally proposed only to perceptions and sense experiences, after behaviourism had disposed of motives etc., but later extended to include intentional states as well
Leibniz law � for all x and for all y, if x = y, f(x) iff f(y)
an experience can be green + octagonal, but a brain state cannot be green + octagonal (or at least, not one you�re likely to survive)
genuine duration of states
gerund � verbal nouns, which have the form of a participle (end in �ing�)
C J F Williams � What is Identity � chapter on Identity of events, definite descriptions etc.
multiple realisability � what do all thoughts about a given subject (or whatever) have in common?
Davidson
������ mental events + physical events are causally connected
������ so can be consumed under strict law
������ no strict psycho-physical laws
is probably thinking of the prodn of belief by phys objects in our environment
John McDowell in LaPore & McLaughlin (A & E)
creatures that have beliefs + desire = approx. rational
metonymical???
states defined in terms of causal relations